

11 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/I

1. There is one defect in the current organization of CIA that has worried me for a number of years and which my recent experience on the Cuban problem has emphasized. This defect is the lack of a systematic intelligence support structure in the operating elements of CIA.

2. If we were to think of DD/P, its divisions and stations, as being the G-3 section and the troop units of a field army, it would seem at first glance that the DD/I area would represent the G-2 section of this field army. The facts of the case, however, are quite different. The DD/I area is oriented primarily to serve as the G-2 section of the highest level of the U. S. Government, and while obviously its products have some utility to DD/P, this utility is strictly a by-product of our main function. This deficiency in the organization is not widely recognized in DD/P. The average DD/P officer with whom I have come in contact is not aware of the intelligence support to operations that could be provided through the use of the skills, techniques, and institutions already developed in the intelligence community.

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3. Various parts of the intelligence support gap in DD/P had been filled in different ways.

The reports officers throughout DD/P also do a certain amount of intelligence support as a by-product of the background which they have to build up in order to do their basic job of producing CS reports. Some divisions also have a few staff officers who perform parts of this function without it being clearly recognized that this is what they are doing.

4. DPD is probably the best served DD/P division in this sense, in that they do have an intelligence staff whose job it is to provide intelligence support for operations. This intelligence staff is not only capable of producing a good deal of the intelligence support itself, but is sufficiently familiar with the intelligence community to know where to go to get help on those matters it cannot handle itself.

5. In the case of the Target Analysis Branch of the War Plans Staff, there has been something of a running fight with the Geographic Area of ORR because of the tendency of the Target Analysis Branch to re-do work produced by ORR when it could probably have been done better by ORR in the first place if there had been proper levying of requirements and adequate briefing of ORR concerning the operations to be supported.

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6. The problem was particularly acute in the case of the Cuban task force. The task force as such had no intelligence section and as far as I know the only people in the task force specifically working on intelligence were a small group in the PM Section in Headquarters who were working on terrain studies in preparations for the invasion. Furthermore, this small group attempted to work in such a compartmented manner that they did not take full advantage of the assistance they could have received from PIC, ORR, and others. In the FI, political action, and propaganda fields there was no independent intelligence support. The heads of the respective section in the last analysis acted as their own intelligence officers. In the case of the base in Miami, there was no intelligence support organization at all, which meant that the intelligence sent to the base from Headquarters was not properly used and information collected by the base was not adequately integrated into the planning and operations of the base. To the best of my knowledge, none of the bases in the Project had an intelligence officer.

7. Although the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the major action arms of the U. S. Government, and although it is an intelligence agency, it probably makes less use of intelligence in its operations than any other action Agency of similar stature. If, as a result of changes in the structure of the intelligence community that may come about in the next few months, there is an opportunity for the situation to be corrected, I strongly recommend something along the following lines:

a. A Chief of Operational Intelligence reporting directly to DD/P and supported by an Intelligence Staff which would be responsible for seeing that the DD/P received adequate intelligence support for any decisions that he is required to make concerning the operations of DD/P. This staff might control the FI reports apparatus and certainly should control the intelligence support functions of Division D. It should also have a small number of highly competent analysts who could do original work when necessary, but who could also draw upon intelligence already available to the intelligence community in order to apply it to specific operational problems.

b. Each Division should have an Intelligence Officer reporting directly to the Division Chief and supported by a small staff in order that the Division Chief might make his operational decisions in light of full intelligence support.

c. Each major base and station overseas should also have an intelligence officer performing the same function for the Chief of the Base or Station. In the case of the larger installations

the intelligence officer should probably also be supported by a staff. The intelligence officers at the division and lower levels should be under the command of the Chief of the Unit to which they are assigned, but there should be a right of secure communications on intelligence matters through

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the intelligence structure and outside of the DD/P command structure.

8. I can see several advantages to this system in addition to the primary advantage of making it possible for CIA operations to be conducted on a sounder basis.

a. The new system should make it possible to bring into the intelligence community a great deal of information and area knowledge that now remains untapped in the compartmented areas of DD/P.

b. The new system could act as a meeting place for the two sides of the Agency that now have very little in common. Many well qualified DD/I personnel could move into the operational intelligence field and from there into operations while many operational personnel with good area knowledge and experience could reverse the processes and eventually become useful members of the DD/I area.

c. It should have additional intangible benefits by helping to break down the isolation of the two major portions of the Agency and tend to make people feel they belong to CIA rather than to DD/P or DD/I.

d. The existence of a half-way house between DD/P and DD/I might make it easier to establish a more meaningful career management program throughout the Agency.

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